Evidence-based acceptance of physical protection effectiveness under multi-event stress

Abstract

This thesis addresses the problem of evidence-based acceptance of physical protection effectiveness for high-consequence facilities under multi-event stress conditions. The issue is operationally relevant because concurrent incidents such as diversionary actions, false-alarm surges, degraded communications, and simultaneous intrusion attempts can erode sufficiency even when a system is formally compliant with prescriptive requirements. In such regimes, failure is rarely caused by a single technical component; it emerges from the coupled information-and-control loop that links detection to validation, decision-making, dispatch, and response. When this loop is slowed by workload and resource contention, the defender may lose the time reserve required to interrupt the adversary before the critical element is reached. The goal of the study is to propose an acceptance approach in which sufficiency is demonstrated through measurable, scenario-conditioned criteria and predefined evidence channels rather than through documentation closure or isolated subsystem checks.